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Abstract 
Despite the widely held view in newly emerging democracies that constitutions are 
mere words on paper or that parchment barriers cannot render a state stable or demo­
cratic, those who draft such documents commonly act as if words ARE of consequence. 
The difficulty, however, is that contemporaneous conflicts too easily intervene so as to 
corrupt the drafting process and to preclude optimal constitutional design. The specific 
principle of design most likely to be violated is the proposition that we treat all parts 
of the constitution as an interconnected whole and that we not try to assess the conse­
quences of one part without appreciating the full meaning of all other parts. This essay 
illustrates this violation by looking at the new Russian Constitution, ratified by direct 
popular vote in December 1993, with special attention paid t9 that document's treat­
ment of federalism. We offer the additional argument, however, that even contemporary 
research in political institutional design pay s insufficient heed to this principle. 
CONSTITUTIONS FOR NEW DEMOCRACIES: 
REFLECTIONS OF TURMOIL OR AGENTS OF 
STABILITY?1 · 
Peter C. Ordeshook 
1. Introduction
Constitutions are rarely written in a vacuum, insulated from the political conflicts that swirl 
about them. The uncertain and confused steps taken in drafting ones for Poland and Ukraine, for 
example, bear witness to the impact of contemporary disputes, just as the extraordinary powers 
granted the president by Russia's new constitution signal unambiguously who won the conflict 
there in 1993 between Yeltsin and the People's Congress. With the exception of states that had 
constitutions imposed on them by some occupying military force or by a dictator who sought to 
apply a democratic gloss to his regime, not only has the philosophy of the American constitution 
been a template for others, but the process by which that document was prepared -- contentious 
wrangling over sectional and substantive issues -- has been replayed countless times as well. 
There are three lessons to be learned from these wars of words. First, despite the view of 
many that constitutions are mere words on paper or that parchment barriers cannot render a state 
stable or democratic, they tell us that those who draft such documents act as if words ARE of 
consequence. Either constitutions allocate power, or contentious negotiation over their content is 
manifestly irrational. Second, the product of these wars need not correspond to any optimal or 
rational design. We may be able to understand that product in the same terms as we come to 
understand any social process, but we can appeal to theories of many types -- to social choice 
theory or to the pitfalls of short-sighted vote trading -- to predict that the resulting documents 
will only accidentally adhere to some definition of social rationality. The final lesson -- actually, 
more an hypothesis -- is that the observed failures of constitutional democracy should not be 
interpreted to mean that constitutions have little or no effect. Such examples are consistent with 
a contrary· proposition; that absent a theory of constitutional design sufficiently compelling to 
overcome myopic self-interest, they illustrate the consequences of the poor constitutional designs_ 
born of the imperatives of that self-interest. 
This essay was made possible through support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
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Our purpose here is not merely to argue that constitutions matter or that the exigencies of 
contemporary politics can preclude the implementation of appropriate political institutions. 
Instead, we want to off er some advice to those who would craft such documents so that less is left 
to chance or surprise. Section 1, then, considers three examples, drawn from the Soviet experience, 
that illustrate the preceding lessons, and which show in particular that constitutions matter even 
for states without a democratic tradition. Section 2 considers briefly the process and conflicts that 
led to the ratification of Russia's current constitution in order to illustrate the principle most 
commonly violated when crafting new constitutions. That principle is that the various parts of a 
constitution should be treated as interdependent components of the document. Section 3 focuses 
on federalism and describes how that principle was violated owing to contemporaneous conflicts 
so that Russia failed to formulate a wholly integrated constitutional system. Finally, Section 4 
argues that although several (but hardly all) of the problems Russians created for themselves have 
subsequently been resolved, little guidance was provided them by the comparative political 
literature on constitutional and political institutional design and that until this literature develops 
further, we can suppose that states will continue to duplicate Russia's experience. 
1. Lessons from the Soviet Union
The constitution of the Soviet Union, both it's '36 Stalinist and '77 Brezhnevian versions,
offered a panoply of constitutional rights as detailed and expansive as anything set to paper in the 
West. Chapter X of the 1936 document "guaranteed" the right to free speech, a free press, free 
assembly, equal protection, freedom of religion and thought, equal rights for women, the 
inviolability of the person and due process, and, conflating negative with "positive" rights, the 
right to work, rest, material security, and education. The USSR's failure to satisfy these 
constitutional .prescriptions, though, is often taken to indicate a failure, if not of constitutionalism 
in general, then at least of its applicability to Russia and "Russian tradition." The fault of those 
documents, though is not that they failed, but rather that they worked precisely as designed. 
Those who believe they failed owing to the gap between promise and reality are correct to 
assert that merely setting words to paper about rights and social welfare entitlements did not and, 
in general, cannot accomplish much. Only appropriately designed and properly functioning 
institutions can ensure adherence to rights and the promulgation of legitimate governmental policy. 
The presumption of failure, though, is based on a preoccupation with only one of three questions 
we can ask about a constitution when evaluating its performance. In this instance the question 
asked is: Did the constitution lead to the realization of stated goals? The answer, evident to 
everyone, is NO (at least insofar as rights and welfare guarantees is concerned), and therein lies 
the basis of pessimism about the prospects for a democratic society guided by constitutional 
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principles among the citizens of the successor states of the Soviet Union. But before we concur in 
this judgement, we must answer two other questions: Did Soviet constitutions legitimize or 
contribute to the stability of the political institutions they prescribed; and were those institutions 
appropriate for the realization of the rights and guarantees it identified as goals? Only if our 
answers to these questions are NO and YES can we deem a constitution a failure. In fact, our 
answers are exactly the opposite. 
The problem with Soviet constitutions was that they were based on a social theory that assumed 
that people are perfectible and that beliefs and values can be changed fundamentally so that social 
·goals become private ones. Thus, they enshrined a political system doomed to failure. However,
although they failed to achieve what is beyond the reach of any constitution -- guarantee the
realization of lofty principles by mere proclamation -- Soviet constitutions succeeded to the extent
that the system and institutions they legitimized did in fact function as described. Setting Marxist­
Leninist principles at the core of Soviet social organization, both the '36 and, even more
forthrightly, the '77 constitutions legitimized the dictatorship of the Communist Party, and having
done that, all the rest was mere window dressing. In fact, absent a Constitutional Court, neither
constitution was intended as working law (Blankenagel 1992). This is not to say that those
constitutions played a role in forming political structures: those structures existed before either
document was written. Thus, the '77 document codified many of the post-Stalinist changes in
Soviet law and, by institutionalizing the role of the communist party more forthrightly in Article
6, signaled the transition from Stalin's personal dictatorship to that of the party. Both documents,
then, gave legal sanction to what existed so that, with respect to our second question about their
influence on political structures, we should judge Soviet constitutions as either irrelevant to events
or we can infer that they contributed to the strength of institutions. In either case, the answer to
our second question ought to be YES.
Turning to our third question, about the adequacy of that structure for realizing stated goals, 
we can, of course, debate whether the USSR's dissolution was inevitable and whether Gorbachev's 
"reforms" merely hastened the end (see, for example, Laqueur 1994 for a critical survey of the 
literature). Insofar as the gap between constitutional pronouncement and reality is concerned, 
though, the social theory on which Soviet constitutions were based -- the '36 one, the '77 one, or 
the much-amended version of the '77 one that disappeared in 1991 -- failed to anticipate the 
inevitable consequences of the unchecked power: inefficiency and corruption. Nevertheless, this 
was the structure that Soviet constitutions legitimized, and this was the one that prevailed. Soviet 
constitutions failed to deliver on their promises, then, not because constitutionalism is somehow 
alien to the "Russian soul" but because they legitimized a political system that failed to channel 
self-interest so as to serve the public interest. Thus, the answer to our third question is NO. 
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So, if there is a lesson to be learned generally from the USSR's constitutional experience, it is 
not that constitutions did not work. The lesson is either that that experience is an irrelevant 
experiment or that even bad constitutions can, for a time at least, be stable. This argument does 
not challenge the view that history would have been unchanged if any of these constitutions was 
merely a blank piece of paper. It need not convince anyone that a new constitution can lead to 
something other than what exists, and it does not contradict the assertion that the USSR or any of 
its successor states must proceed along historical paths that can only be interrupted but not negated. 
by attempts at developing a constitutional democracy. To counter these arguments requires 
consideration of the more general matter of how constitutions in fact influence political processes, 
how they ensure rights, and how they facilitate the establishment of stable political systems. 
Our second example comes also from the Soviet experience, and illustrates more directly how 
even the Soviet constitution influenced things. Although both the '36 and '77 versions allowed for 
secession in principle (Articles 17 and 72, respectively), these words were generally understood to 
be void of content; indeed, both documents precluded such a possibility by their failure to off er 
any procedure for separation. However, thinking that he could borrow time for his reforms, in 
1990 Gorbachev acceded partially to Lithuanian demands and allowed implementing legislation 
that specified a clear albeit tortuous path to secession. The effect, though, was to legitimize 
secession as part of Soviet law, thereby emboldening leaders in the Baltic republics to pursue 
separation from the USSR more vigorously (Sharlet 1992). Thus, playing the coordinating role that 
is the ultimate basis of the enforcement of their provisions (Hardin 1989, Ordeshook 1992), we 
have here an example of a constitution (and its implementing legislation) coordinating expectations 
so that what was deemed illegal under one set of words becomes legal and attainable under a 
different set. 
Our third example comes from Russia itself and the constitution, largely a reprint of the '77 
Soviet text, that was superseded by the 1993·document. Although that constitution was amended 
to establish a president, to empower a Constitutional Court, and to proclaim the principle of a 
separation of powers, Article 104, consonant with the revolutionary slogan "all power to the 
Soviets," gave the Congress of People's Deputies (actually, the Supreme Soviet) the authority to 
legislate and govern in all important matters. Thus, following the demise of a communist party that 
could negate theoretical inconsistencies, the document' s logical flaws found full play in the conflict 
between Yeltsin and parliament that resulted in a mini-civil war that was resolved only by military 
force. Unlike Soviet constitutions, though, the Russian one can be credited with empowering new 
institutions (notably, the presidency and the Constitutional Court). Thus, rather than argue that 
constitutions had little in the early years of an independent Russia, we can find good reasons for 
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arguing exactly the opposite, provided we appreciate the ways in which it constitution encouraged 
political conflict. 
2. A First Principle of Constitutional Design 
Admittedly, the evidence that Soviet-era constitutions influenced events is not scientifically 
compelling. However, although Russians commonly lament that constitutions can never be much 
more than mere words, the drafting of Russia's current constitution, like most constitutional 
drafting processes, was approached as though it was critical to the resolution of several internal 
conflicts: "Constitutions are usually retrospective documents, not prospective ones. They are 
designed to solve the most pressing problems of the past, not the future. Yeltsin's constitution is 
no exception ... " (Holmes and Lucky 1994) and "political institutions ... often get chosen more 
because of calculations made during the process of change ... than because certain versions of these 
institutions are uniquely appropriate ... " (Colomer 1995). We cannot here review the events leading 
to the preparation and ratification of that constitution and to Yeltsin's Ukaz 1400 dissolving the 
old parliament (for overviews of those events see Tolz 1993, Rutland 1994, Semler 1994). We need 
only note the basic issues that confounded that process. Briefly, those conflicts were, 
between those who accepted the view that constitutional rights were first and foremost 
limitations on the state, versus those who sought to compel the state to partake of a variety 
of welfare entitlements and to regulate not only the state, but society as well. 
between those who saw a constitution as a minimal document that concerned essential 
institutional details, versus those who viewed them more as a social contract in which as 
much detail as possible was included to preclude disputes over meaning. 
between those who argued for the strong hand most consonant with a presidential system, 
versus those who feared Russia's traditions of Czar rule and wh.o pref erred parliamentary 
government. 
between those who feared Russia's disintegration and preferred a unitary state, versus 
those who saw federalism as the only way to govern a state as heterogeneous as Russia. 
Several participants in the drafting process were familiar with Western practice, but opponents 
in these disputes were rarely motivated by principled notions of constitutional democracy. Yeltsin 
sought a strong presidency because he was president; conservatives in the People's Congress argued 
for a parliamentary system because they sought to undermine Yeltsin's policies (Thorson 1993); 
leaders of the republics argued for federalism because they wished to maximize their autonomy 
and control of the resources on their territories; politicians in Moscow preferred a unitary state 
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because they sought to maintain control of governmental revenues and because they knew no-0ther 
governmental form (Sharlet 1993); the Constitutional Reform Commission argued for an elaborate 
document since that was the style of their ill-prepared draft and to argue otherwise was to hand 
the constitutional agenda to competitors; competitors such as St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly 
Sobchak and Yeltsin advisor Sergi Shakrai argued the opposite to seize the agenda and the label 
'the James Madison of Russia'; and those who argued for extensive welfare entitlements did so 
because doing otherwise was to reject their heritage 
,
of democratic centralism. 
The details of these disputes concerned nearly every article of the various draft constitutions 
·(Cohen 1993 ), and their final resolution was a document that contradicts many of frs loftily stated
principles. Despite proclaiming Russia a federation (§ 5), federal subjects are precluded from 
establishing their own independent judiciaries (§ 118) or from controlling the method whereby 
deputies to either national legislative branch are elected (§ 96); regional governments possess few 
if any exclusive policy jurisdictions (§ 71 and 72) and have no authority over local governments 
(§ 132 and 133); the president is empowered to overturn those regional executive acts he deems 
unconstitutional(§ 85); regional governments possess no independent taxing authority(§ 72), there 
is no guarantee of the obligation of contracts and no comity clause; and, in perhaps the clearest 
reincarnation of Lenin's idea of democratic centralism, the constitution provides that "federal 
executive bodies and the bodies of executive authority of the members of the Russian Federation 
shall form a single system of executive authority" (§ 77). Despite proclaiming the people as the 
ultimate sovereign (§ 3) and rights as inalienable (§ 17), citizens have no standing before the 
Constitutional Court(§ 125), constitutional rights are confused with citizen duties (§ 57-59), and 
the law is allowed to limit rights in order to uphold "the foundations of the constitutional system, 
morality, or the health, rights and lawful interests of other persons or for ensuring the defense of 
the country and state security"(§ 55). And despite proclaiming a governmental form based on a 
separation of powers (§ 10), in addition to the duties and powers normally associated with that 
office (appointment, legislative initiative, veto) and in addition to being anointed "guarantor of 
the constitution" (§ 80), the president of the Russian Federation is empowered to dissolve 
parliament (§ 84), to appoint ministers without legislative oversight (§ 83), and to issue decrees 
insofar as the law is silent(§ 90) -- a power Yeltsin has already used under the guise of controlling 
rampant crime to abrogate constitutional rights (Cohen 1995). 
This constitution, then, violates not only a good many ideas about democratic institutional 
design, but also its own stated objectives. Many of those violations can be resolved through 
amendment, judicial interpretation, and evolving tradition. But if we want to argue that politics 
distorts the design of constitutions and precludes the implementation of appropriate institutions, 
we need to consider what specific principles of design are most likely to be violated. Only when 
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we identify the "disease" can we off er a cure. And here our argument is that the principle most at 
risk is the proposition that 
all parts of the constitution are interconnected and that we cannot assess the consequences 
of one part without appreciating the full meaning of all other parts. 
The violation of this principle is a consequence of the understandable inability to isolate. 
writing a constitution from the conflicts that make constitutions essential and is manifest in the 
tendency to address each part of the document separately, as an arena for negotiations between 
competing interests. Thus, the presidential powers enshrined by Russia's constitution are best 
understood as a byproduct of the presidential-parliamentary conflict that preceded it, and by the 
fact that Yeltsin won that conflict. For example, the president is empowered to name and fire his 
own ministers without parliamentary approval because of the Congress's recalcitrance at approving 
earlier presidential recommendations; the president can dissolve the Duma if it fails to approve his 
nomination for Prime Minister because of Yeltsin's earlier inability to secure the re-appointment 
of Yegor Gaider to that post; the president can issue decrees with the force of law because the 
dissolved Congress had been unwilling to extend his emergency authority; and the constitution fails 
to provide for the office of vice-president because Yeltsin's first vice-president, Alexandar 
Rutskoi, became a focal point for parliamentary opposition to his policies. 
As with presidential-parliamentary relations, the treatment of federalism was isolated from 
other parts of the constitution (except the president's authority to over-ride regional executive 
actions). The connection of this part of the constitution to the sections dealing with presidential 
and parliamentary powers, for example, comes only as background: Yeltsin originally offered the 
republics special privileges to secure their support (in particular, majority control of the upper 
legislative chamber, the Federation Council). But once victory was achieved, he reneged on his 
"constitutional promises" and has since sought to render federal mere administrative appendages 
of the central government (Sharlet 1993 ). 
Election procedures were relegated to implementing legislation or decree in part to ensure 
flexibility, but also because Yeltsin's supporters could not agree on which procedures best served 
their interests. The issue at hand here was selecting an election method that offered the best chance 
of filling the new parliament with "democratic" reformers. Lip-service was paid to the idea that 
something must be done to facilitate the formation of national political parties and to avoid 
dangerous ethnic and regional ones, but national party-list proportional representation was used 
to elect half the State Duma out of fear that communists would dominate the traditional single-
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mandate election districts and that even regional PR would not allow democrats to take full 
advantage of their concentrated urban support. 
3. Federalism: Violating the First Principle
It is understandable that contemporaneous conflicts should influence the actions of 
constitutional draftsmen. But such conflicts need not preclude good design. To see how this is 
possible, consider again the subject of federalism. Briefly, throughout 1992 and 1993 debate on 
this subject focused on three words: sovereignty, supremacy, and symmetry. Yeltsin's early.drafts, 
written to accommodate republic demands, labeled Russia's ethnic republics sovereign, which they 
interpreted as affording them the same status in international affairs as Stalin claimed for Ukraine 
and Byelorussia when negotiating their seats in the United Nations. Sovereignty also impacted on 
the issue of supremacy, and several republics asserted that republic laws were supreme over federal 
ones or that republics could nullify federal laws on their territory. The current constitution 
proclaims the supremacy of federal law, but the issue remains a contentious one and contradicts 
several republic constitutions (as well as the treaties negotiated with those republics that proclaim 
equal status for all constitutions). Finally, the issue of symmetry arose in the debate over whether 
Russia's ethnic republics would enjoy privileges not possessed by its other regions (oblasts and 
krais). Yeltsin's early drafts allowed federal subjects to renegotiate their status on a bilateral basis 
with Moscow, thereby confounding the meaning of the provision that all federal subjects "shall 
be equal in their relations with federal bodies of state authority" (§ 5), and although the final 
version makes no mention of such negotiations, a variety of bilateral asymmetric agreements have 
been negotiated between the republics and Moscow (Teague 1994). 
Although the draft ratified in December 1993 imposed a federal form that made only modest 
accommodation of regional and republic demands, there was little dispute over what parts of the 
constitution were the core of its federal provisions, namely those pro','.isions dealing with 
supremacy and secession; 
the admission of new federal subjects or alterations in the boundaries of existing 
ones; 
the role of federal subjects in amending the constitution; 
free trade within the federation; 
the policy jurisdictions of national and regional governments; 
democratic governance within federal subjects; 
the judicial system; 
representation in the national legislature. 
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Insofar as how the constitution treats these topics, we might pref er a more restricted grant of 
authority to the national government and a more explicit guarantee of democratic governance 
within federal subjects, but most of the items on this list find treatments that parallel other state 
constitutions. Federal law is unambiguously supreme (§ 15, 76), secession is prohibited (§ 4), new 
federal subjects can be admitted in accordance with procedures specified by federal law (§ 65), 
no subject's boundary can be altered without the affected subject's consent (§ 67), approval by 
super-majority of federal subjects is .required to a�end the constitution (§ 136), free trade is 
guaranteed within the federation(§ 74), and, paralleling Articles 73 and 74 of the German Basic 
Law, the national government has an explicit role in most issues of public policy (§ 71 and § 72).
The rather ambiguous guarantee of democratic governance (§ 5) is most likely a consequence of 
the philosophy of democratic centralism that colors Russian thinking. 
The instinct to compartmentalize constitutional issues, though, led to an unsatisfactory 
accommodation of the last two items on this list, and to a failure to consider several additional 
parts of the constitution, namely those that concern the following: 
control over the methods of election to the national legislature as well as state 
legislatures; 
the timing of presidential and parliamentary elections; 
the method of electing the president; 
elections as a means of filling federal subject and local public offices; 
the content of federal subject constitutions. 
Insofar as the judicial system is concerned, the constitution appears to foil the design of 
balanced regional governmental structures based on a separation of regional executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers insofar as it precludes independent regional courts when it requires that the 
country's judicial system "be established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal 
constitutional law"(§ 118) and that "judges [be] ... subject only to the Constitution and federal law" 
(§ 120). To our knowledge, little thought was given to the role of the judiciary in a federal system. 
Instead, the primary concern was to avoid a repeat of Yeltsin's experience with a runaway 
Constitutional Court chaired by someone (Zorkin in the case of the old Court) who sided too 
frequently with opponents. 
We can imagine ad hoc accommodations to the problems of a centralized judiciary, including 
the passage of federal laws that allow for reasonably independent regional judicial structures, 
owing to regional and republic representation in both chambers of the national legislature. But here 
we run afoul of the constitution's treatment of the last item on our first list -- representation in 
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the legislature -- and its failure to consider fully the consequences of its treatment (or non­
treatment) of the items on our second list. Briefly, the relevance to federalism of these things, 
which may be treated directly or only indirectly by a constitution, is that they influence the 
structure and role of parties, their degree of decentralization, the vertical integration of local 
parties with national ones, and correspondingly, the extent to which local, regional, and national 
governmental structures form an integrated whole in which local politicians "naturally" accede to 
the supremacy of federal law and national politicians are "naturally" protective of regional 
autonomy (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1995). If "political parties created modern democracy ... and 
modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties" (Schattschneider 1941: 1), then 
it is also true that, in William Riker's (1964: 136) words, "Whatever the general social conditions, 
if any, that sustain the federal bargain, there is one institutional condition that controls the nature 
of the bargain in all instances here examined and in all others with which I am familiar. This is 
the structure of the party system, which may be regarded as the main variable intervening between 
the background social conditions and the specific nature of the federal bargain." Thus, the 
preceding provisions, in combination with those that treat representation in the national legislature, 
are as important to federalism as are the provisions relegated to those sections of a constitution 
labeled "The Organization of the Federation." 
Unfortunately, unfamiliarity with party politics combined with contemporaneous political 
conflicts to preclude consideration of Riker's admonition about the role of parties and the ways 
to encourage the development of parties appropriate to a federal state. Instead, each of the items 
on this second list were attended to in the context of other issues. Thus, 
the basis of representation in the State Duma, as we note earlier, was considered only in 
the context of securing control of that chamber and minimizing the prospects of opponents. 
Thus, the electoral system decreed by Yeltsin allowed Zhirinovsky to secure a plurality of 
PR seats, ensured a highly fractured party system, and discouraged anything but a top­
down Moscow-centered process of party formation. 
fearful of regional bosses, the constitution merely states that "the procedure for forming 
the Federation Council ... shall be determined by federal law" (§ 96) and that the Council 
should "be composed of two representatives from each member of the Russian Federation; 
one from its representative and one from its executive body of state authority" (§ 95). 
Thus, the constitution fails to provide for direct election of deputies to the Federation 
Council, and leaves to door open to presidential appointment. Also, with "democrats" in the 
Kremlin concerned about the strength of regional communist party organizations, it gives 
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full control of parliamentary elections (including the drawing of districts for the State 
Duma) to Moscow (§ 96). 
Because Yeltsin saw no reason to jeopardize his own position and because he sought to 
maintain a Czar-like distance from "normal" politics, he postponed the presidential election 
until June 1996. Thus, rather than hold that election at the same time as parliamentary 
ones, parliamentary elections will be held six months before the presidential contest. 
The constitution requires only that the president be elected by direct vote (§ 81 ). Thus, 
there is no explicit (as in Nigeria) or implicit (as in the United States) constitl).tional 
requirement that the next president be elected with broad geographic support. 
The last two items on our subsidiary list of constitutional provisions -- regional and local 
elections and regional constitutions -- are not normally addressed by a national constitution. But 
Yeltsin's subsequent policies here are consistent with a myopic view of constitutional democracy. 
Fearing the loss of political control that might accompany the rise of regional leaders with 
independent electoral mandates, Yeltsin has resisted allowing direct election of regional governors 
and the constitution sustains presidential appointment of regional plenipotentiaries (§ 83). 
Although it is assumed that regional Dumas and local Soviets will be directly elected, with 
attention focused on ensuring that local and regional governments rescind the mandated share of 
tax revenues to the federal government (Wallich 1994), little if any thought has been given to the 
role elections might play in regional and local governance. The constitution makes vague reference 
to direct citizen involvement in local governance (§ 130), but it is clear that the authority of local 
governments will be closely controlled by Moscow. And although the constitution makes reference 
to 'republic constitutions' and 'regional charters'(§ 5), it offers no guidance as to the content of 
those documents. Moscow's attempt to control that content has focused on ensuring that they do 
not contradict the federal constitution, Yeltsin's decrees, or federal law.-- in particular, that they 
not undermine Moscow's attempt to control Russia's vast natural resources. 
Of course, we should not be surprised to see manipulation of electoral procedures in the 
interests of those who have the power to do so. Much of the early history of American state and 
national politics focused on such manipulations (see, for example, Williamson 1960, Hoadley 1986), 
just as interests of the same type dictated the selection of procedures in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the fall of communism (Colomer 1995, Holmes 1994). On the other hand, aside from 
Yeltsin's dissolution of regional soviets after the overthrow of parliament in 1993, little thought 
appears to have been given to the role of elections at the regional and local levels, and even less 
to the procedures that might be used there. Certainly the encouragement of parties that would 
facilitate stable federal relations is not seen as a relevant consideration when the provisions on our 
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second list were addressed. One might argue, perhaps, that the creation of a true federation was 
never the intent of those who drafted the final document. We suspect, though, that much of its 
democratic-centralist flavor is the result of the general belief that only traditional command-and­
control devices could arrest the forces that threatened the fragmentation of Russia -- a belief that 
was the consequence of an inability to understand the potential role of parties in a federation and 
the failure to estimate the extent to which these provisions might usefully influence that role. 
4. Operating in Accord with the First Principle 
It is one thing to assert that constitutions ought to be written as fully integrated documents; it 
is another thing to contend successfully with the political pressures and crises that normally 
surround their preparation and ratification. Nevertheless, ref erring again to the Russian case, there 
are solutions to this seemingly insurmountable problem. We can begin by noticing that several 
solutions were achieved "automatically" following the December '93 parliamentary elections. 
It was soon understood that Yeltsin's aloofness from the election was an error and for this 
reason he encouraged the formation of two electoral blocks in April 1995, one headed by 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the other by State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin -- blocks 
that could either support his bid for reelection or that could support a centrist candidate 
if Yeltsin chose not to run. 
The '93 elections also revealed the dangers of national party-list proportional 
representation, and Yeltsin has since argued for a reduction in the number of seats to be 
filled this way (although incumbent Duma deputies resist changing a system that led to 
their initial success). 
For the same reasons that the Duma resist changing the procedures under which it was first 
elected, direct election of the first Federation Council has become part of Russia's 
constitutional order, and the role here of 'representative and executive bodies' will become 
that of merely nominating candidates -- a role that is likely to be supplanted as regional 
parties take form. 
Much of the debate over electoral reform prior to December '95 examined the pros and 
cons of postponing parliamentary elections until 1996 so that presidential and 
parliamentary contests could be held simultaneously. Although it is unlikely that 
parliamentary elections will in fact be postponed, there is growing sentiment to alter the 
election schedule to allow for simultaneity some time in the future. 
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Yeltsin moved close to issuing a decree in March '95 that would have sustained his 
authority to appoint regional governors, but he has been dissuaded from doing so upon the 
advice of those within the Kremlin who are most familiar with regional affairs. 
Also, although the republics, following Tatarstan's lead, adopted constitutions that contradicted 
the federal one (by proclaiming the supremacy of their constitutions and laws), Moscow muted this 
issue with a series of bilateral treaties so that, in exchange for increased autonomy, the republics. 
have largely dropped their claims to sovereignty (Teague 1994). 
Thus, resistance to many of the things that would have led to a better integrated constitution 
and a more viable federal system in fact disappeared soon after the constitution's ratification. Of 
course, this is not to say that this resistance has disappeared owing to a better understanding of 
constitutional design, and it remains true that there is serious resistance to many of the things that 
would facilitate a move viable federal state -- regional governments with independent taxing 
authority, more extensive use of regional and local elections, regional governments with full 
control over their charters and constitutions, and regional control of elections to both chambers 
of the national legislatures. Earlier arguments for sequenced elections, party-list PR, and a 
president who was above politics gave way to political realities rather than more ready acceptance 
of reasoned arguments about political institutional design. 
Thus, many of the errors of design, both today and in 1993, were not based on strongly held 
beliefs about the best way to organize the transition to democracy, but instead were the result of 
faulty judgements as to what procedures and tactics best served the self-interests involved and of 
the force of contemporaneous conflicts that compelled and continue to compel a divorced attention 
to constitutional issues. This is not to say that beliefs and actions can ever be easily changed, but 
especially with respect to beliefs about the consequences of certain choices, we can see with the 
benefit of hindsight where good ·social science arguments might have moved things in a different 
direction. Unfortunately, such arguments were not forthcoming, because political scientists in the 
West largely have largely ignored the subject of constitutional design or are guilty of the same 
error of compartmentalization that characterized Russian efforts. Despite Riker's (1964) seminal 
arguments and Horowitz's (1991) focus on the importance of electoral institutions in ethnically 
divided federal states, Sartori's (1994) recent discussion of presidential and parliamentary systems 
and of election laws, for example, devotes less than a page to federalism, Linz and Valenzuela's 
(1994) 2-volume study of the failures of presidential systems devotes a scant two pages to the 
subject, while Powell's ( 1982) analysis of democratic stability relegates federalism to two footnotes; 
Neither Lijphart's (I 992) edited volume on presidential and parliamentary systems nor Shugart and 
Carey's ( 1992) book on presidential-legislative structures include the words 'federal' or 'federalism' 
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in their indexes, the index to Ostrom's (1991) otherwise seminal analysis of American federalism 
makes no mention of 'party\ the World Bank's assessment of federal relations in Russia (Wallich 
1994) makes only passing reference to political structures and wholly ignores party competition, 
none of the essays in Elster and Slagstad's (1988) edited volume on constitutionalism pays heed to 
Riker's argument, and although Lijphart's (1984) widely used text devotes a chapter to federalism, 
that chapter offers no discussion of parties. 
But while mainstream comparative texts fail to provide much guidance_, Russians might have 
gained from their own experience. Our arguments about federalism are summarized by the 
proposition that political parties breath life into constitutions structures, that the parties which do 
this are those with strong local roots but which also have an incentive to integrate with national 
parties, and that election laws, the timing and procedures of presidential elections, and the 
autonomy given regional governments to manipulate the elections laws that pertain to regional and 
local offices (including representation in the national legislature) are important influences on these 
incentives. Interestingly, the communist party performed an equivalent function with respect to 
Soviet political institutions. Although the party operated with a top-down command-and-control 
administrative apparatus and its authority did not rest on any electoral mandate, there was 
sufficient content to the theory of democratic centralism that our arguments here about parties and 
federalism might not have appeared wholly alien to those who drafted the Russian constitution. 
Thus, constitutional engineering consistent with our first principle of design, although 
unrealized, was not infeasible. It was more the psychology of conflict rather than specifics that 
compartmentalized the drafting of Russia's constitution. Greater awareness of the need for 
integration, in combination with a better theory of federal constitutional design, would have 
sufficed to avoid many of the inadequacies of that document. This is not to say that the instinct 
to write a document that favored democratic centralism and a unitary state could have been 
averted. It is naive to argue that theory and mere consciousness can compel political elites in 
Moscow to embrace fully the precepts of democratic constitutional federalism. Nevertheless, 
consciousness and better theory would have encouraged such a government. At the same time, 
avoiding violations of our first principle of constitutional design would have been made easier if 
another aspect of the example set by those who met in Philadelphia would have been followed -­
shutting the windows and closing the drapes around those who would write a constitution. 
14 
References · 
Blankenagel, Alexander ( 1992). "Toward Constitutionalism in Russia," East European Constitutional 
Review, 1, 2 (Summer). 
Cohen, Ariel (1993). "Comparing Russia's Constitutional Drafts," Eurasian Reports: What ls 
Russia, Center for American-Eurasian Studies, 3, 2, (Winter). 
Cohen, Ariel (1995). "Crime Without Punishment," Journal of Democracy, 6, 2, April. 
Colomer, Josep M. (1995). "Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe," Journal of Democracy, 
6, 2, April. 
. Elster, Jon and Rune Slagstad, eds. (1988). Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hardin, Russell (1989). "Why a Constitution," in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., The 
Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. N.Y.: Agathon Press. 
Hoadley, John F. 1986. The Origins of American Political Parties. 1789-1803. Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky. 
Holmes, Stephen and Christian Lucky (1994a). "Storm over Compatibility," East European 
Constitutional Revie�, 3, 1 (Winter). 
Holmes, Stephen (1994b). "Designing Electoral Regimes," East European Constitutional Review, 3, 
2 (Spring). 
Laqueur, Walter (1994). The Dream that Failed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lijphart, Arend (1984). Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lijphart, Arend, ed. (1992). Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Linz, Juan J. and Arturo Valenzuela, eds. (1994). The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 2 vols. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Ordeshook, Peter C. (1992). "Constitutional Stability," Constitutional Political Economy, 3, 2, 137-
75. 
Ordeshook, Peter C. (1995). "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy, 6, 2, April. 
Ordeshook, Peter C. and Olga Shvetsova (1995), "If Hamilton and Madison were Merely Lucky, 
What Hope is There for Russian Federalism," Constitutional Political Economy, 
forthcoming. 
Ostrom, Vincent (199L). TheMeaning of .Americau Feder.alism. _San__Francisco: lCS .Press. 
Powell, G. Bingham (1982). Contemporary Democracies. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown. 
15 
Rutland, Peter (1994). "Has Democracy Failed Russia," in Adrian Leftwich, Democracy and 
Development, forthcoming, Polity Press. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1994). Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: NYU Press. 
Schattschneider, E.E. (1941). Party Government. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, Winston. 
Semler, Dwight (1994). "The End of the First Russian Republic," East European Constitutional 
Review, 3, l (Winter). 
Sharlet, Robert (1992). Soviet Constitutional Crisis. Armonk (N.Y.): M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
Sharlet, Robert (1993). "Russia's 'Ethnic' Republics and Constitutional Politics," Eurasian Reports: 
What Is Russia, Center for American-Eurasian Studies, 3, 2, (Winter). 
Shugart Matthew S. and John M. Carey, 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design 
and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Teague, Elizabeth (1994). "Russia and Tatarstan Sign Power-sharing Treaty," RFE/RL Research 
Report. 3, 14, April 8. 
Thorson, Carla ( 1993 ). "The Battle for Central Authority in Russia: A Presidential or Parliamentary 
System," Eurasian Reports: What Is Russia, Center for American-Eurasian Studies, 3, 2, 
(Winter). 
Tolz, Vera (1993). "Drafting the New Russian Constitution," RFE/RL Research Report, 2, 29, 
July. 
Wallich, Christine (1994). Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
Williamson, Chilton, 1960. American Suffrage from Property to Democracy 1760-1860. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
16 
